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Abstract
Media and World Health Organization (WHO) attention on Zika virus transmission at the 2016 Rio Olympic Games
and the 2015 Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa diverted the attention of global public health authorities from
other lethal infectious diseases with epidemic potential. Mass gatherings such as the annual Hajj pilgrimage hosted
by Kingdom of Saudi Arabia attract huge crowds from all continents, creating high-risk conditions for the rapid
global spread of infectious diseases. The highly lethal Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
remains in the WHO list of top emerging diseases likely to cause major epidemics. The 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak in
South Korea, in which 184 MERS cases including 33 deaths occurred in 2 months, that was imported from the
Middle East by a South Korean businessman was a wake-up call for the global community to refocus attention on
MERS-CoV and other emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases with epidemic potential. The international
donor community and Middle Eastern countries should make available resources for, and make a serious
commitment to, taking forward a “One Health” global network for proactive surveillance, rapid detection, and
prevention of MERS-CoV and other epidemic infectious diseases threats.
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Background
Mass gatherings at sporting [1, 2] and religious events [3]
attract huge crowds, creating high-risk conditions for the
rapid spread of infectious diseases. The 2000–2001 menin-
gococcal meningitis outbreak after the Hajj pilgrimage [4]
illustrated this threat of infectious diseases on global health
security. The International Health Regulations Emergency
Committee of the World Health Organization (WHO)
declared Zika virus (ZKV) a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern [5] on 1 February 2016. The
media hype on ZKV transmission at the 2016 Rio Olympic
Games diverted the attention of global public health
authorities from other lethal infectious diseases with
epidemic potential [6]. Attention and resources must
now be refocused on the continuing epidemic threat
of the highly lethal Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) [7, 8].
The global spread of MERS-CoV
Between 8 and 14 September 2016, the cities of Jeddah,
Makkah, and Madinah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA),
hosted the annual Hajj pilgrimage [3]. An estimated 2
million pilgrims attended from 184 countries, lived in
crowded conditions, and performed religious rites in
close proximity, exposing themselves and the local
Saudi population to a range of infectious diseases.
MERS-CoV was first isolated and identified in a 68-
year-old patient who died of pneumonia and multi-organ
failure in Jeddah, KSA, in June 2012 [9]. This is the second
* Correspondence: a.zumla@ucl.ac.uk
1Division of Infection and Immunity, University College London, London, UK
2NIHR Biomedical Research Centre, UCL Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust,
London, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Zumla et al. BMC Medicine  (2016) 14:132 
DOI 10.1186/s12916-016-0686-3
time (after severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus,
SARS-CoV) [10] in the 21st century that a coronavirus has
emerged as a new lethal zoonotic pathogen of humans.
Serological studies show that camels have been in-
fected with MERS-CoV for 20 years. MERS-CoV is a
common infection in dromedary camels, and there is
accumulating evidence that the sporadic human out-
breaks are seeded by zoonotic infection from camels
[11]. There have been intermittent MERS-CoV commu-
nity cases [12] and hospital outbreaks [13–16], but no
sustained epidemic [7]. Hospital case clusters of MERS-
CoV represent the primary location where rapid human-
to-human transmission of MERS-CoV have occurred;
although limited spread among family members has been
observed [17, 18]. SARS-CoV [10] was also predominantly
spread through nosocomial transmission, but the epi-
demiological features of MERS-CoV remain less clear
[19]. While 90 % of reported MERS-CoV cases have been
from KSA, MERS-CoV has spread to 27 countries in
Europe, North Africa, Asia, USA, and the Middle East. All
cases had travel links with KSA or other countries in the
Arabian Peninsula. As of 26 August 2016, 1,800 confirmed
MERS-CoV cases have been reported to WHO from over
21 countries, including 640 deaths (35 % case fatality rate).
MERS-CoV-related mortality is significantly increased in
patients with comorbidities such as diabetes, renal disease,
cardiac disease, lung and liver disease, or other immuno-
suppressive conditions [7, 20]. There are no known effect-
ive treatments or preventive vaccines for MERS-CoV [21].
The continuing spread and epidemic threat of
MERS-CoV
The risk of sustained person-to-person transmission ap-
pears to be very low and MERS-CoV is considered to
have a low epidemic potential [20, 22]. Nevertheless, we
have constant reminders of the epidemic threat of
MERS-CoV from several hospital-associated outbreaks
started by a single case [13–16, 23]. Of particular con-
cern was the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak in the Republic
of South Korea [23, 24], in which 184 MERS cases
(including 33 deaths) occurred in 2 months [23]. These
were linked to a South Korean businessman who had trav-
elled to four countries in the Middle East and contracted
MERS-CoV infection. Falling ill after his return to Seoul,
the patient waited in overcrowded hospital emergency
rooms [24] and was responsible for MERS-CoV super-
spreading events at five hospitals [25]. While this major
outbreak should have been a wake-up call [26–28],
the attention of global public health authorities at the time
was diverted by the Ebola virus disease epidemic in West
Africa [29] and, more recently, by the ZKV epidemic [30].
It remains an enigma that, while SARS-CoV spread
rapidly globally and caused >8,000 cases and 775 deaths
(10 % mortality) before disappearing within 8 months of
discovery [10], MERS-CoV continues to circulate 4 years
after first identification [9], causing intermittent community
and hospital-associated outbreaks [19]. The exact mode of
transmission to humans from camels and other possible
animal sources remains undefined. Worryingly, the very
high mortality and absence of specific MERS-CoV treat-
ments or vaccines will seriously impact healthcare services
of countries from which Hajj pilgrims originate if a Korea-
like outbreak [23–25] occurs from returning pilgrims.
MERS-CoV: vigilance, early detection, and
infection control measures
The past three annual Hajj pilgrimages (14 October
2013, 3 October 2014, and 23 September 2015) have
passed by without any increase in travel-related MERS-
CoV cases [19]. While KSA authorities are on full alert
for MERS-CoV, with their healthcare systems in place
and resources to tackle MERS-CoV outbreaks, the
healthcare institutions in the home countries of pilgrims
need to remain vigilant for MERS-CoV cases [28]. Advice
has been made available for pilgrims to take precautions
to minimize health risks [31]. Pilgrims with chronic
medical conditions such as diabetes or chronic heart,
liver, and lung conditions, and those taking steroids or
other immunosuppressive treatments are more suscep-
tible to serious MERS-CoV disease and should seek
medical advice before embarking on pilgrimage. The
risk of MERS-CoV infection after exposure to camels
or camel products is real [7, 11, 14]. Pilgrims must
avoid visiting places where camels are found – high-
ways between cities, camel farms and camel races,
farms, barns, or market areas in any part of KSA. They
should not consume raw camel milk or camel products
or food that may be contaminated with animal secre-
tions. In light of growing evidence, KSA authorities
banned the slaughtering of camels for sacrifice and the
movement of camels around Makkah and Madinah
during the 2016 Hajj [32].
The risk of returning pilgrims infected with MERS-
CoV to their home countries remains. Thus, health pro-
fessionals and healthcare systems should remain vigilant
at all times [28], and especially in the months after the
end of the Hajj. Many pilgrims remain in KSA for sev-
eral weeks after the Hajj, but because symptoms of
MERS-CoV infection can occur up to 2 weeks after first
infection [7], early detection is important. Pilgrims
should be advised to seek medical attention promptly,
and they should inform the doctor of their travel to
KSA. As the Korean MERS-CoV outbreak showed [16],
gaps in infection control measures are driving factors
for nosocomial outbreaks. Early identification of the
possibility of MERS-CoV and rapid implementation
by healthcare workers of appropriate infection control
measures for suspected cases is crucial to avoid outbreaks.
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Isolation of suspected and confirmed MERS-CoV cases
managed under airborne-infection control precautions
[33, 34] has been shown to be effective in containing
nosocomial outbreaks [14–16, 24]. Contact tracing and
screening should be undertaken by relevant public health
authorities [33, 34].
Need for more collaborative approach for
optimal management, prevention, and control
of MERS-CoV
MERS-CoV remains in the WHO list of top “emerging
diseases likely to cause major epidemics” [35]. However,
many questions on MERS-CoV epidemiology, patho-
genesis, management, and control remain unanswered
[36–38]. At long last, hope for filling the knowledge
gaps and advancing research activities comes from the
recent “MERS-CoV R&D Program” initiative, a joint en-
deavor by three KSA institutions: Ministry of Health,
Ministry of Agriculture, and King Abdulaziz City for
Science and Technology (KACST) [39]. This program
has made competitive research grant funding available
specifically to Saudi Arabian researchers to build local
capacity. It is anticipated that this will lead to a more
collaborative and coordinated international MERS-CoV
response plan to better define MERS-CoV epidemiology,
transmission dynamics, molecular evolution, pathogen-
esis, optimal treatment, and prevention interventions
for humans and camels. Animal, human, and environmen-
tal factors play a crucial role in the persistence, continuing
outbreaks, and evolution of MERS-CoV. All 184 countries
from which pilgrims originate should strengthen their
public health systems, and the international donor com-
munity, including the wealthy Middle Eastern countries,
should make available resources for a “One Health” frame-
work for early detection and prevention of any future epi-
demics of MERS-CoV and other zoonotic infectious
diseases [40]. Only then will the risk of recurring global
zoonotic epidemics be reduced.
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